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Chapter	3
A	HUMANIST	PARADIGM	FOR	TOURISM
STUDIES?
Envisioning	a	Collective	Alternative	to	Epistemic	Literalism
Kellee	Caton
Thompson	Rivers	University,	Canada
Abstract:	This	chapter	explores	the	potential	for	and	value	of	imagining	a	humanist
paradigm	for	 tourism	studies.	 It	 explores	how	 the	 idea	of	a	“paradigm”	 in	 tourism
can	be	 conceptualized,	 arguing	 that	 dominant	 thoughtlines	 in	other	 fields	 regarding
the	meaning	 of	 a	 paradigm	 are	 not	 sufficient	 for	making	 sense	 of	 this	 idea	 in	 the
context	 of	 tourism	 studies.	 The	 chapter	 introduces	 humanism	 as	 a	 philosophical
position	in	the	academy	and	as	a	lived	cultural	practice,	explores	examples	of	extant
work	 in	 tourism	 studies	 that	 might	 be	 seen	 to	 provide	 the	 seeds	 of	 a	 humanist
paradigm,	and	offers	reflections	on	the	value	of	imagining	such	a	paradigm	for	our
field.
Keywords:	Pragmatist	humanism;	paradigm;	epistemology;	relationality;	inclusivity
INTRODUCTION
Does	it	make	sense	to	speak	of	an	emerging	humanist	paradigm	in	tourism	studies?	In	the	first
instance,	 it	 depends	 on	what	 one	means	 by	 a	paradigm.	 In	 the	 next	 instance,	 it	 depends	 on
whether	one	can	spot	seeds	of	such	a	paradigm	in	the	contemporary	body	of	thought	on	tourism,
and	more	 importantly,	 whether	 calling	 these	works	 into	 conversation	with	 each	 other	 holds
catalytic	 promise.	What	 new	 vistas	 could	 be	 opened	 on	 the	 tourism	world	 through	 such	 an
exploration?
This	chapter	considers	these	sorts	of	queries,	in	the	quest	to	explore	the	idea	of	a	humanist
paradigm	for	tourism	studies.	It	begins	by	considering	the	notion	of	a	paradigm	in	a	complex,
multidisciplinary	 social	 research	 field	 like	 our	 own.	 Having	 offered	 thoughts	 on	 how
knowledge	advances	in	tourism	studies,	and	how	an	understanding	of	the	same	can	help	us	to
conceptualize	 what	 paradigms	might	 look	 like	 in	 our	 field,	 it	 then	 turns	 more	 directly	 to	 a
discussion	of	humanist	philosophy	itself,	offering	an	overview	of	this	perspective,	along	with	a
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discussion	of	criticisms	that	have	arisen	around	it.	It	follows	by	undertaking	a	search	for	work
in	 tourism	 studies	 that	 might	 provide	 the	 ingredients	 for	 a	 humanist	 paradigm,	 and	 finally
concludes	by	offering	thoughts	on	the	value	of	imagining	such	a	paradigm	in	our	field.
WHAT	IS	A	PARADIGM	IN	TOURISM	STUDIES?
A	few	years	back,	Airey	(2008)	made	the	clever	point	that,	for	tourism	studies,	life	begins	at
40.	 He	meant	 by	 this	 that	 after	 40	 years	 of	 development	 of	 subject-specific	 journals,	 book
series,	 and	 conference	 networks,	 which	 house	 increasingly	 sophisticated	 discussions	 of	 our
phenomenon	of	study,	plus	the	steady	expansion	of	educational	programming,	ever	increasing
in	both	its	horizontal	complexity	(in	terms	of	the	sub-specialties	students	may	pursue,	such	as
hospitality	or	event	studies)	and	its	vertical	complexity	(in	 terms	of	 the	 levels	of	credentials
offered,	 which	 now	 stretch	 up	 to	 the	 PhD),	 we	 may	 have	 finally	 reached	 a	 point	 of
institutionalization	as	a	field	in	which	it	is	possible	to	wrap	our	heads	around	this	collective
enterprise	we	are	engaged	in	and	name	it	as	a	body	of	knowledge	in	its	own	right.	A	logical
part	of	this	maturation	process	of	tourism	studies	is	undoubtedly	the	recent	interest	in	projects
of	 collective	 reflexivity	 about	 our	 field—sometimes	 dubious,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 ever-
proliferating	league	tables	of	“top	tourism	programs”	and	“most-cited	tourism	academics,”	and
sometimes	 enormously	welcome,	 as	 in	 analyses	 like	 that	 presented	 by	Munar	 et	 al.	 (2015),
who	map	gender	and	power	in	tourism	studies;	Tribe	(2006,	2010),	who	considers	the	forces
that	shape	knowledge	production	in	our	field,	and	describes	its	structure	and	culture;	and	Réau
(2014),	who	offers	us	tools	for	engaging	in	acts	of	reflexivity	at	the	level	of	our	field.
The	inclination	to	speak	of	paradigms	in	our	field	is	part	of	this	striving—a	sort	of	desire
for	 collective	 metacognition	 that	 allows	 us	 to	 make	 sense	 of	 the	 larger	 project	 we	 are
dedicating	our	energies	to	and	put	our	work	into	perspective—and	one	which	potentially	has
political	 advantages	 as	well	 (Belhassen	&	Caton,	 2009),	 as	we	 jockey	 for	 our	 place	 in	 the
contemporary	university,	among	the	mighty	and	towering	traditional	disciplines	that	seem	often
to	be	viewed	as	having	a	more	natural	claim	to	the	territory	of	higher	education	than	we	later-
comers	do.	But	how	to	make	sense	of	the	idea	of	a	paradigm	in	our	context?
As	members	of	the	broader	social	research	or	social	science	family,	tourism	scholars	may
be	most	familiar	with	talk	of	paradigms	in	a	research	philosophy	and	methods	context.	In	this
domain,	 the	 work	 of	 scholars	 like	 Lincoln,	 Guba,	 and	 Denzin	 looms	 large	 for	 its	 valuable
contribution	in	teasing	out	the	different	philosophical	approaches	that	undergird	much	current
social	research	and	exploring	the	points	of	convergence	and	confluence	between	them	(Denzin
&	Lincoln,	2003;	Lincoln	&	Guba,	2003).	These	scholars	use	the	term	“paradigm”	to	refer	to	a
set	 of	 basic	 ontological	 and	 epistemological	 beliefs	 that	 guide	 a	 researcher	 in	 her
methodological	 engagement	 with	 the	 phenomena	 she	 studies	 (Guba	 &	 Lincoln,	 1994).	 This
work	on	 social	 research	philosophy	 is	 no	doubt	valuable	 for	 tourism	 scholars,	 for	 the	 same
reason	it	 is	helpful	 to	anthropologists,	geographers,	sociologists,	psychologists,	and	so	forth,
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who	study	other	domains	of	sociocultural	life	besides	tourism.	But	it	is	of	limited	utility	for	our
present	 purposes	 precisely	 because	 of	 this	 generality.	 It	 is	 equally	 applicable	 to	 all	 social
research	fields	and	works	at	the	level	of	how	knowledge	about	the	social	world	is	created:	it
cannot	tell	us	anything	about	what	knowledge	is	created,	and	thus	does	not	usefully	orient	us	if
our	task	is	to	analyze	and	understand	the	unique	knowledge	content	of	our	field.
Likewise,	tourism	scholars	may	be	familiar	with	the	notion	of	a	paradigm	set	forth	by	Kuhn
(1962)	in	his	celebrated	work	on	the	Structure	of	Scientific	Revolutions,	in	which	he	argued
that	 scientific	 progress	 does	 not	 occur	 through	 the	 linear	 accumulation	 of	 facts	 and
understandings	 generated	 by	 adherence	 to	 a	 pure	 and	 unchanging	 method,	 but	 rather	 is	 a
thoroughly	 human	 process	 conditioned	 by	 the	 ever-evolving	 circumstances	 and	 possibilities
available	 at	 the	 time	 inquiry	 ensues.	 Kuhn	 uses	 the	 term	 “paradigm”	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 coherent
framework	of	thought	within	which	understanding	of	a	particular	scientific	phenomenon	can	be
pursued.	 (To	 take	 what	 is	 probably	 his	 most	 commonly	 cited	 example,	 the	 Ptolemaic
positioning	of	the	earth	at	 the	center	of	the	cosmos	constituted	a	paradigm	that,	for	nearly	15
centuries,	 governed	 the	 kinds	 of	 questions	 asked	 by	European	 astronomers	 and	 the	 kinds	 of
observations	and	calculations	they	made	to	answer	these	questions.)	As	anomalies	that	do	not
fit	 the	 prevailing	 coherent	 thought	 framework’s	 set	 of	 assumptions	 occur	 and	 begin	 to
accumulate	 (in	 the	 previous	 example,	 observations	 that	 cannot	 be	 explained	 by	 calculations
derived	from	a	geocentric	model),	the	assumptions	of	the	underlying	thought	framework	begin
to	be	called	into	question.	Alternative	conjectures	then	begin	to	arise,	but	generally	have	little
power	 as	 one-off	 explanations	 of	 a	 given	 anomaly.	 Once	 a	 sufficient	 volume	 of	 alternative
conjectures	 arises,	 however,	 and	 more	 importantly,	 once	 those	 conjectures	 are	 able	 to	 be
integrated	to	form	a	new	coherent	framework,	then	a	new	paradigm	takes	form.	There	is	then
typically	a	transition	period	in	which	the	original	paradigm	and	the	new	paradigm	rival	each
other	for	adherents,	and	in	the	end,	the	paradigm	with	more	explanatory	power	wins	out,	with
the	other	one	falling	to	the	wayside	to	be	relegated	to	the	annals	of	scientific	history	as	a	quaint
footnote	 about	 the	 old-fashioned	 way	 of	 doing	 things.	 Kuhn’s	 conceptualization	 thus
emphasizes	not	only	the	basic	beliefs	of	a	researcher	that	guide	the	approach	she	takes	to	her
subject	matter	but	also	something	of	the	body	of	knowledge	that	is	accepted	about	that	subject
matter,	which	tends	to	condition	what	kinds	of	questions	will	be	asked.
This	focus	on	a	body	of	knowledge,	and	the	changes	that	happen	within	it	as	the	result	of
collective,	communally	held	understandings,	makes	Kuhn’s	notion	of	a	paradigm	in	some	ways
more	useful	 to	us	 than	Guba	and	Lincoln’s	 (1994)	conceptualization.	The	 latter,	 in	 taking	 the
individual	researcher	as	its	point	of	departure	and	abstracting	itself	from	the	concrete	context
of	knowledge	production	in	any	particular	field,	lacks	an	orientation	toward	both	content	and
collectivity,	and	both	of	these	are	needed	if	the	goal	is	to	analyze	knowledge	production	in	our
field.	 But	 Kuhn’s	 conceptualization	 is	 problematic,	 too.	 Anchored	 as	 it	 is	 in	 the	 realm	 of
natural	science,	it	cannot	be	neatly	applied	to	social	research,	because	knowledge	about	human
phenomena	doesn’t	progress	 in	 the	 same	way	as	knowledge	about	natural	phenomena.	 In	 the
social	world,	there	is	no	lodestar	of	objective	truth	toward	which	we	can	confidently	point	our
ship;	there	is	no	equivalent	of	atoms	or	gravity	about	which	we	can	securely	author	universal
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laws.	Thus,	a	conceptualization	in	which	it	is	in	the	nature	of	paradigmatic	activity	for	each	in
a	succession	of	competing	frameworks	to	supersede	the	one	that	came	before,	by	virtue	of	its
superior	explanatory	ability,	cannot	ultimately	go	very	far	in	explaining	intellectual	activity	in
a	field	where	reality	and	truth	are	plural	and	dynamic—a	field	like	our	own.
If	the	notion	of	a	paradigm	is	to	be	useful	in	a	field	like	tourism	studies,	then	in	order	to
conceptualize	 it	 in	 a	 fruitful	 way,	 we	 must	 begin	 with	 the	 more	 basic	 question	 of	 how
knowledge	 advances	 in	 a	 field	 like	 ours.	 Together,	 Yaniv	 Belhassen	 and	 I	 have	 written
previously	about	this	matter	(Belhassen	&	Caton,	2009),	setting	forth	what	we	characterized	as
a	linguistic	approach	to	knowledge	development	in	tourism	studies.	In	this	piece,	we	drew	on
Nietzschean	 thought	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 distance	 between	 any	 human	 conceptualization	 of	 a
scientific	truth	and	an	ultimately	secure	foundation	for	that	truth	(assuming	any	such	foundation
even	exists)	will	never	be	fully	bridged.	Human	understanding	about	the	world	is	linguistically
constrained,	such	that	the	assertions	we	produce	are,	at	rock	bottom,	no	more	than	metaphors
for	describing	 the	world	we	encounter.	The	 language	systems	we	create	are	what	allows	for
communication	 among	 individuals,	 and	 between	 larger	 groups	 of	 individuals,	 about	 the
phenomena	we	encounter.	Bodies	of	literature,	such	as	that	of	tourism	studies,	are	best	read	as
the	living	record	of	that	communicative	process.	They	are	the	dynamic,	ever-evolving	corpuses
of	 the	 series	of	metaphors	we	create	 for	describing	 the	world	 in	ways	 that	help	us	 to	better
cope	with	it.	There	are	no	grounds	for	holding	a	correspondence	theory	of	truth	in	knowledge
production,	 because	 we	 will	 never	 have	 unmediated	 access	 to	 a	 referent	 for	 our
conceptualizations	that	exists	outside	of	language	(Rorty,	1989).	This	is	not	to	say	that	there	is
no	real,	material	world	beyond	our	own	thoughts;	rather,	it	is	to	say	that	we	will	never	be	able
to	 fully	 cross	 the	 “theory	 gap”	 that	 separates	 that	 reality	 from	 our	mental	 conceptions	 of	 it.
Thus,	the	value	of	knowledge	lies	not	in	an	unachievable	capturing	of	the	truth	of	the	world	as
it	really	 is,	but	 rather	 in	 the	generation	of	conceptions	 that	allow	us	 to	 function	better	 in	 the
world.
In	fields	that	center	on	understanding	social	phenomena	like	tourism,	large	swaths	of	that
which	 is	 to	 be	 studied	 could	 be	 argued	 to	 lack	 any	 underpinning	 of	 objective	 reality	 at	 all.
What	is	the	objective	truth	of	a	pilgrim’s	faith	experience?	Of	a	sightseer’s	ethical	obligations?
Of	 the	 role	 of	 researcher	 identity	 in	 tourism	 knowledge	 creation?	 In	 this	 case,	 a	 linguistic
approach,	which	 sees	 tourism	 knowledge	 production	 not	 as	 the	 quest	 to	 capture	 and	 reflect
objective	truth,	but	as	a	“complex	negotiated	communicative	project,	containing	a	multitude	of
paradigmatic,	 historical,	 methodological,	 and	 disciplinary	 influences	 …	 in	 which	 scholars
from	different	 backgrounds	 engage	 together”—and	moreover	 as	 a	 process	which	 is	 “always
conditioned	 by	 power,	 by	 the	 institutionalized	 setting	 under	 which	 it	 occurs,	 and	 by	 the
rhetorical	 and	 textual	 constructions	 utilized	 by	 its	 producers”—becomes	 all	 the	more	 useful
(Belhassen	&	Caton,	2009,	p.	337).	It	is	the	best	answer	I	have	yet	found	for	making	overall
sense	of	how	knowledge	can	be	seen	as	progressing	in	such	a	complicated,	fragmented	domain,
composed	 of	 so	 many	 diverse	 research	 themes,	 disciplinary	 influences,	 and	 paradigmatic
allegiances.
Following	 this	grounding,	 then,	Yaniv	and	 I	proceeded	 to	offer	 three	guiding	dimensions
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through	 which	 knowledge	 progression	 in	 tourism	 studies	 can	 be	 viewed.	 The	 first	 is	 the
development	of	 tourism	morphology,	 or	 the	 creation,	 expansion,	 refinement,	 and	overhaul	 of
terms,	 concepts,	 metaphors,	 and	 models	 about	 our	 subject	 matter.	Morphology	 is	 important
because	the	concepts	we	create	are	the	flashpoints	around	which	intersubjective	exchanges	can
ensue.	Words	are	our	common	meeting	ground—the	realization	notwithstanding	that	this	ground
will	always	be	shaky	because	meaning	is	never	fixed	or	permanent	(Hall,	1994).	Words,	as	the
vehicles	of	conceptual	connections,	carry	moral	baggage	as	well,	a	point	which	will	become
important	later	in	this	chapter.	The	second	dimension	through	which	knowledge	progression	in
tourism	 can	 be	 viewed	 is	 the	 creation	 and	 propagation	 of	 new	 interpretations	 and
understandings	of	tourism	phenomena.	Concepts	and	empirical	observations	(and	other	forms
of	 data	 gathering)	 amalgamate	 to	 become	 (more	 or	 less)	 insightful	 frameworks	 or	 theories
about	how	different	aspects	of	our	tourism	world	work.	Again,	different	disciplines,	different
paradigms	within	and	across	disciplines,	and	so	forth	will	have	their	own	rhetorical	norms	and
their	 own	 politics	 of	 evidence.	 But	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 day,	 what	 all	 scholars	 (in	 tourism	 or
otherwise)	are	doing	is	interpreting	data	and	using	language	to	make	a	case	for	the	value	of	a
particular	 way	 of	 imagining	 some	 aspect	 of	 the	 world.	 Such	 interpretations	 are	 discursive
profusions	that	carry	even	more	moral	weight	than	the	words/concepts	that	compose	them,	by
virtue	of	the	more	highly	organized	projections	of	the	world	they	weave.	The	third	dimension
through	 which	 epistemological	 movement	 in	 tourism	 studies	 can	 be	 registered	 is	 the
mobilization	of	concepts	and	frameworks	toward	the	purpose	of	practical	problem	solving	by
those	in	 the	 tourism	field,	such	as	 industry	practitioners	and	policymakers.	 It	 is	 in	 this	realm
that	our	creative	discursive	activity	rises	up	and	walks	off	of	the	page,	to	participate	in	shaping
an	external	world	in	its	own	image.
Such	a	conceptualization	of	what	we	are	doing	when	we	do	tourism	knowledge	production
demands	a	notion	of	paradigm	that	does	not	rest	on	the	search	for	a	singular	truth;	as	such,	it
cannot	be	imagined	as	a	singular	set	of	assumptions	that	governs	a	field	(near)	totally	until	it	is
overthrown	by	a	 succeeding	 set	of	 assumptions,	which	 in	 turn	do	 the	 same.	Multiple	 sets	of
assumptions	must	be	able	to	co-exist.	Instead,	in	keeping	the	focus	on	consequences	rather	than
truth—on	usefulness	rather	than	correspondence	to	some	external	reality—a	paradigm	can	be
seen	 as	 an	 orientation	 to	 a	 field	 of	 study	 that	 highlights	 particular	 problems	 as	 being	worth
solving	and	goes	about	solving	them	in	particular	ways,	based	on	an	underlying	set	of	beliefs
and	values,	which	govern	both	problem	selection	and	solution.	The	fruits	of	that	orientation	can
be	 located	as	particular	outputs	 in	 the	body	of	knowledge	 (in	 this	 case,	 tourism	knowledge)
which	are	traceable	back	to	the	underlying	assumptions	that	spurred	them.	(In	this	way,	Lincoln
&	 Guba’s,	 2003,	 style	 of	 work	 becomes	 more	 helpful,	 in	 reminding	 us	 of	 the	 kinds	 of
assumptions—ontological,	 epistemological,	 methodological,	 and	 axiological,	 for	 example—
that	are	working,	often	behind	the	scenes,	to	drive	the	shape	of	knowledge	produced.)	It	is	thus
through	this	sort	of	conceptualization	that	a	paradigm	can	become	a	useful	organizing	concept
for	 a	 field	 like	 tourism	 studies,	 helping	 us	 to	 analyze	 the	 knowledge	we’ve	 produced	 in	 an
historicized	way	that	does	not	require	us	to	accept	any	particular	truth	standard,	but	which	is
capable	 of	 shedding	 light	 on	 important	 patterns	 and	 meaningful	 differences	 in	 the	 way	 our
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subject	matter	is	being	addressed.
In	keeping	with	this	understanding	of	a	paradigm,	the	goal	of	this	chapter	is	to	explore	one
branch	of	philosophy—pragmatist	humanism—and	to	search	for	the	seeds	of	work	within	the
tourism	corpus	that	would	allow	us	to	imagine	it	as	a	paradigm	in	our	field.	To	do	this,	let	us
first	 consider	 humanist	 philosophy	 itself,	 exploring	 its	 contours,	 considering	 some	 of	 the
criticisms	 that	have	been	 leveled	at	 it,	 and	 imagining	 it	 in	 its	most	 robust	 light	as	a	 tool	 for
thinking	about	contemporary	intellectual	action	in	tourism	studies.
Humanist	Philosophy
Humanism	 is	 an	 antifoundational	 philosophical	movement	 that,	 at	 its	 core,	 ascribes	 positive
value	 and	 worth	 to	 human	 beings.	 It	 emphasizes	 the	 unique	 character	 of	 humans	 as	 moral
creatures	and	 is	optimistic	 that	we	can	use	our	moral	 capacity	 to	make	 improvements	 in	 the
world	 around	 us.	 Humanism	 is	 not	 merely	 a	 descriptive	 perspective,	 but	 a	 normative	 one,
emphasizing	 that	with	 our	 capacity	 for	moral	 reasoning	 comes	 the	 responsibility	 to	 use	 this
capacity	for	the	greater	good.
Although	some	who	would	consider	 themselves	adherents	 to	a	humanist	perspective	also
consider	themselves	to	be	religious	or	spiritual,	humanism	holds	that	religion	is	not	necessary
as	 a	 moral	 basis	 for	 society.	 We	 need	 not	 (necessarily)	 look	 to	 metaphysical	 forces	 for
guidance;	 rather	we	 come	 naturally	 equipped	 to	 negotiate	 life’s	moral	 terrain,	 thanks	 to	 our
capacity	 for	compassion	and	empathy.	This	capacity	 is	viewed	by	humanists	as	 requiring	no
further	 justification	 beyond	 itself:	 We	 need	 not	 science,	 nor	 intellectual	 arguments,	 nor
religious	convictions	as	means	of	“proof”	in	order	to	choose	to	accept	this	point	of	departure.
As	 is	 probably	 already	 becoming	 obvious,	 humanism	 is	 a	 pragmatic	 philosophy.	 Rorty
(1989),	 one	 of	 the	 20th	 century’s	most	 famous	 voices	 in	 humanist	 philosophy,	 describes	 the
figure	of	the	humanist-pragmatist	as	the	“liberal	ironist”—with	the	label	of	“liberal”	referring
to	 “one	 who	 believes	 that	 cruelty	 is	 the	 worst	 thing	 we	 do,”	 and	 the	 notion	 of	 “ironist”
referring	 to	(if	 I	may	amalgamate	his	more	subtle	descriptions	 into	a	single	broad	stroke)	an
acceptance	of	the	irony	that	there	are	no	secure	foundations	of	truth	for	even	our	most	deeply
held	beliefs—including	those	about	the	worth	of	compassion	and	the	horrors	of	cruelty.	In	true
pragmatist	 form,	 ends	 and	 processes	 are	 judged	 as	 good	 or	 bad	 based	 on	 their	 outcomes:
specifically,	on	whether	or	not	they	increase	the	happiness	and	decrease	the	suffering	of	human
beings	and	other	living	creatures,	including	future	generations.	Thus,	consequences	trump	truth
as	humanism’s	central	concern.	We	do	not	need	epistemological	criteria	(i.e.,	truth	foundations)
to	prove	 that	 happiness	 is	 good	 and	 suffering	 is	 bad;	 instead,	we	 can	make	 these	 judgments
simply	based	on	the	outcomes	of	shared	human	experience	(although	certainly	not	everyone’s
definition	of	pleasure	and	pain	will	be	the	same).	Humanism’s	pragmatic	orientation	naturally
leads	its	affiliates	to	emphasize	contextual	reasoning	and	situation-based	judgments,	rather	than
blanket	 rules,	 for	moral	choices	and	behaviors,	and	 this	 is	another	 reason	 that	 the	movement
often	 asserts	 itself	 as	 existing	 in	 opposition	 to	 religious-based	 forms	 of	morality,	 when	 the
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latter	are	generalized	as	constituting	codified	systems	of	relatively	inflexible	rules.
It	is	probably	most	accurate	to	say	that	humanism	as	we	know	it	in	the	modern	sense	only
arose	after	the	mid-18th	century	with	the	Enlightenment,	but	tracing	the	intellectual	and	cultural
roots	of	this	movement	is	a	more	complex	undertaking,	not	least	for	the	reason	that	the	term	has
been	 used	 in	many	 senses,	 in	many	 times	 and	 places	 in	 recorded	 history,	 and	 these	 various
connotations	are	not	unrelated	to	the	present	philosophical	movement	under	discussion.	During
the	 Renaissance,	 humanism	 was	 associated	 with	 valuing	 the	 intellectual	 and	 artistic
contributions	of	 the	humanities—literature,	music,	 visual	 art,	 and	philosophy,	 for	 example—
and	the	term	was	adopted	in	a	curricular	sense	in	higher	education	after	that	time	to	indicate	a
stance	 promoting	 the	 liberal	 arts.	 The	 term	 has	 also	 been	 used	 to	 connote	 a	 love	 or
appreciation	for	that	which	is	human,	a	position	which	casts	an	optimistic	gaze	on	our	species
and	its	works	and	potential.	Similarly,	the	specific	ideas	embraced	by	humanist	philosophy,	as
noted	above,	in	particular	its	emphasis	on	compassion-based	morality	that	derives	from	human
beings	 without	 need	 of	 being	 undergirded	 by	 supernatural	 forces	 and	 on	 the	 human	 call	 to
moral	 responsibility,	 also	have	deep	 roots	 regardless	of	whether	 the	word	 “humanism”	was
used	to	describe	this	way	of	thinking	or	not.	In	this	sense,	humanistic	reasoning	can	be	traced	to
Renaissance	 thought,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 much	 earlier	 traditions	 as	 diverse	 as	 Buddhism,
Confucianism,	 and	 ancient	 Greek	 and	 Medieval	 Islamic	 thought.	 These	 traditions	 all
emphasized	one	or	more	 central	 humanist	 principles,	 such	 as	 tolerance;	 the	 call	 to	 “do	unto
others”;	the	value	of	reason,	science,	and	other	forms	of	scholarship	in	serving	as	a	basis	for
understanding	 the	 world	 and	 forming	 sound	 decisions;	 the	 importance	 of	 individual	 free
thought;	and	the	need	to	work	in	service	of	social	progress	and	the	greater	good.
In	the	modern	era,	humanism	began	to	find	more	formal	and	institutionalized	expression	in
the	“ethical	culture	movement”	that	arose	in	Great	Britain	and	the	United	States.	Early	ethical
societies	in	London	were	generally	affiliated	with	liberal	religious	traditions	like	Unitarianism
and	 were	 central	 hubs	 for	 championing	 social	 reforms	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 women’s	 equality,
worker’s	 rights,	 and	 public	 health	 (Law,	 2011).	 Their	 American	 counterparts	 would	 take
another	hundred	years,	until	the	end	of	the	19th	century,	to	spring	up,	and	when	they	did,	under
the	 leadership	 of	 fallen-away	 rabbi-in-training	 turned	 university	 professor	 Felix	Adler,	 they
took	 the	 movement	 further	 on	 its	 trajectory	 away	 from	 religious	 affiliations	 and	 toward
establishing	 its	 own	 independent	 identity.	The	 ethical	 societies	 formed	under	Adler’s	 vision
emphasized	the	possibility	of	(indeed	the	need	for)	morality	to	exist	independent	of	theology;
the	 responsibility	 of	 human	beings	 to	 engage	 in	 philanthropic	 activities	 and	work	 for	 social
progress;	 the	 need	 to	 continuously	 strive	 for	 self-improvement	 (in	 keeping	 with	 the
transcendentalist	 sentiments	 so	 en	 vogue	 in	 the	 American	 Northeast	 at	 that	 time);	 and	 the
importance	of	judging	others	based	on	their	actions	rather	than	on	ascribed	characteristics	like
gender	or	religion	(“deed	not	creed”)	(Radest,	1969).	Humanism	had	much	to	show	for	itself	in
the	 19th	 and	 20th	 centuries,	 serving	 as	 a	 driving	 force	 behind	 a	 variety	 of	 successful
progressive	 social	 causes,	 including	 slavery	 abolition,	 labor	 rights,	women’s	 suffrage,	 civil
rights	 for	 racial	and	ethnic	minority	groups,	disease	eradication,	and	universal	education	 for
children	 in	many	 parts	 of	 the	world.	As	 these	 activities	 evidence,	 key	 to	 the	 philosophy	 of
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humanism	is	 the	belief	 that	human	beings	have	 the	power—through	scholarly	 inquiry,	 logical
reasoning,	empathy,	communication,	and	many	other	important	capacities—to	improve	our	own
lives	and	the	lives	of	those	around	us:	the	status	quo	is	not	inevitable.
It	is	perhaps	the	destiny,	especially	in	our	current	“information	age,”	of	all	loose	coalitions
of	ideas,	 in	philosophy	or	elsewhere,	 to	eventually	become	more	codified	than	many	of	their
adherents	 might	 prefer.	 Certainly,	 this	 is	 the	 case	 with	 humanistic	 thinking,	 which	 as	 noted
earlier,	has	incredibly	diverse	roots	and	is	united	only	by	a	handful	of	very	simple	principles,
such	as	a	belief	in	the	moral	capacity	of	human	beings;	a	view	that	theology	is	not	necessary	as
a	basis	for	morality	and	that	human	compassion	is	instead	the	best	starting	place;	the	placing	of
a	high	value	on	free	thought,	reason,	and	scholarly	inquiry	as	tools	for	social	improvement;	and
the	belief	that	human	beings	hold	a	duty	to	improve	themselves	and	their	societies.	Indeed,	if
the	publishing	industry	is	any	indication	with	its	spate	of	humanism	“guides”	and	“handbooks”
(e.g.,	Cave,	2009;	Hancock,	2011;	Herrick,	2005),	this	philosophical	perspective	is	faring	no
better	 than	any	other	 in	escaping	the	ossification	process.	Such	a	reality	makes	discussion	of
the	scholarly	and	political	criticisms	and	controversies	surrounding	humanism	difficult,	as	it	is
easy	to	generally	assume	a	sort	of	standard,	garden-variety	version	of	the	thing,	when	of	course
there	 are	 many	 strands	 of	 humanism	 and	 much	 internal	 disagreement	 about	 the	 particulars.
Thus,	any	given	criticism	may	be	applicable	to	some	conceptualizations	of	humanism	but	not
others.	 (As	 both	 Pernecky,	 2014,	 and	 Munar	 (Munar,	 Pernecky,	 &	 Wheeler,	 forthcoming)
would	put	it,	humanism	has	“many	shades	of	grey.”)
Political	criticism	of	humanism	has	come	 in	both	popular	and	scholarly	 forms,	and	 from
both	 the	 right	 and	 the	 left,	 although	often	 the	 arguments	of	 its	 detractors	do	not	 strike	me	as
wholly	 coherent.	 The	 philosophy’s	 emphasis	 on	 secularism	 has	 unsurprisingly	 rendered	 it	 a
target	for	conservative	religious	groups,	and	in	the	United	States	for	the	political	right,	which
has	 become	 increasingly	 aligned	with	 such	 groups	 (Baumgartner,	 Francia,	 &	Morris,	 2008;
Jelen,	1994).	Those	on	the	right	tend	to	equate	humanism	with	moral	relativism.	This	critique
misses	the	mark,	because	although	humanism	advocates	a	flexible	and	contextual	approach	to
moral	 reasoning,	 recognizing	as	 it	does	 that	 life’s	 inevitable	complexity	often	presents	 in	 the
form	of	dilemmas	for	which	there	are	no	easy	solutions,	it	holds	certain	fundamental	principles
about	human	dignity	and	care	for	others	to	have	irrefutable	value	and	to	be	at	the	core	of	moral
decision-making;	thus,	it	is	anything	but	relativistic.
Humanism	is	also	not	synonymous	with	Romanticism,	although	it	is	often	confused	as	such,
in	 what,	 from	 my	 lived	 experience,	 I	 might	 call	 the	 “popular	 academic	 imagination.”
Romanticism	was	a	movement	that	arose	predominantly	in	the	first	half	of	the	19th	century	in
Europe,	 in	 response	 to	 and	 critique	 of	 the	 Industrial	 Revolution	 and	 its	 concomitant
rationalization	of	many	aspects	of	modern	life.	The	Romantic	Movement	held	the	figure	of	the
individual	 in	 high	 regard,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 notions	 of	 free	 artistic	 expression	 and	 emotional
indulgence.	 Nature	 loomed	 large	 in	 the	 world	 of	 Romanticism,	 and	 Romantics	 were	 often
suspicious	of	the	synthetic	human	world,	viewing	human	life	to	be	perhaps	at	its	most	authentic
when	 individuals	 were	 able	 to	 contemplate	 the	 natural	 world	 in	 solitude.	 Thus,	 although
Romanticism	 shares	with	 humanism	 a	 positive	 view	 of	 the	 capabilities	 of	 humankind	 and	 a
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belief	that	humans	should	aspire	to	greatness,	the	former	lacks	the	profoundly	social	character
of	 the	 latter,	 as	well	 as	 the	 latter’s	admiration	of	 some	aspects	of	 science	and	modernity.	 In
humanism,	it	is	not	primarily	the	individual’s	quest	for	experience	of	the	world,	but	rather	his
or	her	capacity	to	grow,	improve,	and	contribute	to	social	good,	that	is	defining.	Humanism	is
also	not	 romantic	 in	 the	 sense	of	naïvely	believing	 that	 there	 are	 easy	 answers	 to	 the	moral
conundra	any	individual	will	inevitably	face	in	his	or	her	life	course.	To	act	with	compassion
is	 the	 goal,	 but	 just	 how	 to	 best	 exercise	 compassion	 in	 any	 given	 situation	 is	 a	 perennial
question	in	any	human	life,	and	many	times	an	easy	answer	is	not	forthcoming.	Humanism	does
not	seek	to	gloss	this	reality,	but	rather	holds	it	directly	at	heart.
The	misconception	 of	 humanism	 as	 romantic	 in	 a	 naïve	 sense	 strikes	 me	 as	 parallel	 to
Higgins-Desbiolles	 and	Whyte’s	 (2013)	 (arguably	 misplaced)	 critique	 of	 Pritchard	 et	 al.’s
(2011)	notion	of	“hopeful	 tourism,”	 in	 the	 sense	of	operating	at	 the	wrong	 level	of	analysis.
Just	as	we	can	be	hopeful	for	the	creation	of	a	better	tourism	world	precisely	because	we	have
scholars	 like	Higgins-Desbiolles	and	Whyte	 to	help	us	see	what	 the	necessary	preconditions
are	(i.e.,	justice)	for	actualizing	it,	so	too	can	hope	for	engaging	in	a	more	effective	way	with
life’s	moral	 terrain	reasonably	arise,	so	says	humanism,	precisely	by	virtue	of	humans	being
willing	to	seek	a	clear-eyed	view	about	the	realities	of	life’s	moral	complexity.
Likewise,	criticism	of	humanism	has	come	from	the	scholarly	 left	 in	a	variety	of	stripes.
The	most	codified	of	these	is	“posthumanism,”	a	movement	that	arose	via	feminist	theorists	in
literary	criticism	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	to	then	be	taken	up	by	cultural	studies,	and	ultimately
by	 philosophy	 (Ferrando,	 2013).	 Posthumanism	 reacts	 to	 what	 it	 perceives	 as	 the
anthropocentrism	and	speciesism	of	humanism,	which	is	seen	to	embrace	both	a	human–other
dualism	and	a	sense	of	human	primacy.	As	such,	 it	aims	for	“post-exclusivism:	an	empirical
philosophy	 of	 mediation	 which	 offers	 a	 reconciliation	 of	 existence	 in	 its	 broadest
significations.	Posthumanism	does	not	employ	any	 frontal	dualism	or	antithesis,	demystifying
any	 ontological	 polarization	 through	 the	 postmodern	 practice	 of	 deconstruction”	 (Ferrando,
2013,	p.	29).
According	to	Wolfe’s	(2010)	exegesis	in	his	appropriately	titled	What	Is	Posthumanism?,
this	 perspective	 holds	 that	 humanism	 is	 problematic	 because	 at	 its	 heart	 lies	 the	 individual
subject	(who	it	seems	from	Wolfe’s	description	has	traditionally	been	imagined	as	having,	for
example,	capacities	like	rational	thought,	agency,	and	linguistic	expression).	That	subject	is	the
bearer	of	rights.	Thus,	how	we	define	the	subject	bears	on	what	we	think	we	owe	it,	in	terms	of
these	rights.	We	can	keep	redefining	the	subject	more	and	more	inclusively	(e.g.,	perhaps	we
take	a	capacity	like	linguistic	expression	out	of	the	equation	to	capture	people	or	other	animals
who	do	not	have	that	ability),	and	this	helps	us	in	practical	terms	to	recognize	a	greater	sphere
of	entities	as	falling	within	the	zone	of	those	to	whom	we	are	accountable,	but	that	process	will
only	allow	us,	at	best,	to	de-imperialize	asymptotically,	as	we	bestow	on	ever	more	entities	the
privilege	of	subjecthood.	If	we	want	to	completely	de-imperialize,	then	the	only	path	is	to	get
rid	of	 the	subject	completely.	 (Wolfe	also	seems	 to	 feel	 that	 this	de-imperializing	process	 is
important	even	for	those	already	included	in	the	sphere	of	“humans,”	and	hence	already	owed
full	 rights,	 because	 imagining	 them	 as	 coherent	 subjects	 does	 epistemic	 violence	 to	 their
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complexity,	given	that	none	of	us	are	coherent	wholes.)
Again,	however,	it	is	hard	to	see	a	direct	line	of	engagement	for	this	critique.	Humanism,
on	my	reading,	is	not	so	concerned	about	the	status	of	the	entity	to	whom	a	particular	type	of
moral	behavior	is	owed.	Instead,	its	focus	is	on	the	person	doing	the	behaving—the	human	as	a
moral	 actor.	 Pragmatist	 humanists,	 to	 be	 more	 specific,	 are	 those	 who	 are	 united	 in	 their
(foundationless)	view:	one,	that	compassion	(whatever	that	means	in	a	particular	context,	and
people	will	disagree)	 is	good,	 and	cruelty	 (whatever	 that	means	 in	a	particular	 context,	 and
people	will	disagree)	is	bad,	and	two,	that	the	obligation	is	incumbent	on	any	being	with	the
ability	to	act	and	to	think	about	right	and	wrong	to	use	those	abilities	to	uphold	the	compassion
good–cruelty	 bad	 principle	 (whatever	 that	 looks	 like,	 and	 we	 won’t	 all	 agree—even	 with
ourselves	from	time	to	time,	as	we	grow	and	change	in	our	thinking).
Confessing	 to	 being	 quite	 a	 novice	 to	 the	 body	 of	 literature	 on	 posthumanism,	 my	 first
instinct	was	actually	to	assume	that	the	posthumanism	of	scholars	like	Wolfe	must	obviously	be
referring	to	a	different	version	of	humanism	than	the	one	I	knew.	In	reading	further,	however,	I
was	 able	 to	 locate	 a	 discussion	 by	Wolfe	 (1998)	 in	 a	 more	 obscure	 publication,	 referring
specifically	 to	 the	 pragmatist	 humanism	 of	 scholars	 like	 Rorty	 (1989)	 and	West	 (1989),	 in
whose	work	my	own	understandings	of	humanism	are	grounded.	In	this	discussion,	he	appears
to	 bundle	 Rorty’s	 humanist	 arguments	 about	 compassion	 and	 avoidance	 of	 cruelty	 as	 the
preferred	 basis	 for	 moral	 engagement	 together	 with	 Rorty’s	 liberalist	 arguments	 about	 the
value	 of	 communication	 in	 a	 democratic	 public	 sphere	 as	 the	 best	 pragmatic	 mechanism
humans	have	found	so	far	for	living	together	in	a	way	that	decreases	cruelty.	But	humanism	and
liberalism	advance	separate	claims	(although	they	do	often	seem	to	load	together,	in	terms	of
who	 their	 adherents	 are).	 Wolfe,	 in	 the	 main,	 directs	 his	 criticisms	 against	 Rorty’s	 liberal
public	 sphere	 as	 hegemonic	 to	 those	 who	 do	 not	 want	 to	 live	 in	 this	 mode	 of	 discursive
engagement	 and	 decision-making,	 but	 how	 his	 critique	 extends	 to	 the	 humanism	 part	 of	 the
argument	is	unclear,	especially	given	that	he	quite	surprisingly	closes	his	discussion	in	a	rather
humanist	fashion.
In	 these	concluding	remarks,	he	positions	his	own	ethical	project	as	being	founded	on	us
ridding	 ourselves	 of	 the	 catalogue	 of	 characteristics	 (most	 notably,	 agency)	 that	 we	 use	 to
qualify	 someone	 as	 a	 fitting	 liberal	 subject	 bearing	 rights,	 and	 instead	 adopt	 a	 position	 in
which	 compassion	 is	 given	 freely	 to	 all	 that	 is	 outside	 of	 ourselves,	 with	 no	 sense	 of
reciprocity	or	a	“contract	between	moral	agents.”	He	quotes	a	beautiful	passage	from	Derrida
about	 how	 we	 have	 confused	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 eye,	 thinking	 that	 its	 value	 lies	 in	 being
something	 to	see	with	 (which	presumably	allows	us	 to	make	sense	of	 the	world	outside	and
think	we	have	mastered	it),	when	really	its	value	is	in	being	something	to	cry	with,	as	we	are
moved	by	a	sense	of	care	for	the	other.	This	compassion-based	stance,	which	has	everything	to
do	with	how	a	person	should	behave,	and	nothing	whatsoever	to	do	with	the	question	of	who
or	what	does	or	doesn’t	qualify	to	receive	that	compassion,	is	precisely	what	humanism	is	on
about.	 So	 posthumanism’s	 critique	 here	 seems	 clumsy,	 bundling	 as	 it	 does	 the	 arguments	 of
humanism	 and	 liberalism	 together,	 when	 they	 are	 actually	 separate	 claims,	 as	 well	 as
mislocating	humanism’s	arguments	as	pertaining	to	the	object	who	should	receive	care,	rather
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than	to	the	subject	who	should	give	it.	(Although	liberalism	can	certainly	be	defended	too,	and
one	is	left	to	wonder	how,	in	advocating	compassion	without	dialogue,	Wolfe	intends	to	avoid
what	 Tucker,	 2016,	 conceptualizes	 as	 empathic	 imperialism—assuming	 oneself	 to	 have	 the
epistemic	 righteousness	 to	 correctly	 put	 oneself	 in	 another’s	 shoes,	 and	 therefore	 to	 give
compassion	without	asking	what	compassion	might	look	like	for	the	recipient.)
Indeed,	 many	 of	 humanism’s	 most	 famous	 faces	 are	 explicitly	 antifoundational	 when	 it
comes	 to	 who	 the	 subject	 is,	 eschewing	 Platonistic	 reality–perception	 dualisms	 in	 favor	 of
what	Rorty	(1989)	calls	a	plurality	of	“vocabularies,”	precisely	because	embracing	plurality
over	dualism	removes	humanity’s	most	powerful	and	dubious	tool	for	creating	exclusions:	us–
them	 thinking.	 (In	 tourism	 studies,	 this	 position	 is	 highly	 reminiscent	 of	 Bryan	Grimwood’s
work	in	the	Arctic,	discussed	in	the	subsequent	section.)	And	as	for	the	charge	of	speciesism,
surely,	even	for	posthumanists,	this	issue	is	a	matter	of	degrees.	Those	who	would	fall	under
the	 label	 of	 “popular	 humanists”	 appear	 to	 hold	 great	 care	 toward	Gaia	 as	 a	whole,	 if	 the
popular	 guidebook	 descriptions	 of	 the	 movement	 are	 any	 indication.	 And	 it	 is	 difficult	 to
imagine	that	all	those	who	would	count	themselves	as	posthumanist	academics	would	offer	the
same	 right	 to	 life	 to	 the	bacteria	 that	 inhabit	 their	 lungs	during	 a	 case	of	 pneumonia	 as	 they
would	to	themselves,	to	the	war	refugees	evoking	grave	concern	halfway	around	the	world,	or
to	the	cocker	spaniel	down	the	street.
In	the	end,	humanism	is,	more	than	anything	else,	a	standpoint	theory	that	suggests	a	moving
out	 from,	without	 necessarily	 needing	 to	 theorize	 about	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 place	where	 one
started.	It	 is	a	becoming.	“Human”	is	a	convenient	vernacular	word	to	describe	those	having
the	 conversation,	 and	 exclusive	 as	 this	 word	may	 be	 in	 a	 technical	 sense,	 this	 exclusivism
doesn’t	seem	capture	the	spirit	of	the	perspective—neither	as	adumbrated	by	philosophers	nor
as	practiced	by	everyday	folks—so	it’s	important	not	to	confuse	the	signifier	with	the	signified.
For	 these	reasons,	 the	spirit	of	posthumanism’s	arguments	seem	to	stand	not	 in	opposition	 to
humanism,	but	rather	to	fall	within	humanism	and	to	offer	explications	that	help	it	to	better	meet
its	own	inclusivist	goals.
A	Humanist	Paradigm	for	Tourism	Studies?
Of	 late,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 tremendous	 flourishing	 of	 conceptual	 work	 that,	 when	 collected,
begins	to	look	like	something	we	could	imagine	as	a	humanist	paradigm.	Given	the	necessarily
brief	nature	of	discussion	that	can	occur	in	the	space	allowed	here,	this	chapter	merely	seeks	to
highlight	 a	 handful	 of	 instances	 of	 thought	 expression	 that	 are	 particularly	 important	 in	 this
regard,	keeping	in	mind	that	there	are	many	other	wonderful	examples	which	could	also	have
been	included.	As	such,	this	discussion	is	more	idiosyncratic	and	(if	I	might	invent	a	word	that
is	 the	 individual	 and	 personal	 equivalent	 of	 “historicized”)	 “biogratized,”	 than	 it	 is
comprehensive	and	analytical—in	light	of	the	goal	of	this	chapter,	which	is	to	spur	discussion
rather	than	to	attempt	to	reach	a	definitive	state	of	finishedness	in	any	claims	made.
As	 I	 have	 argued	 elsewhere	 (Caton,	 2012),	 what	 Guba	 and	 Lincoln	 (1994)	 call	 the
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“received	view”	of	 social	 research	 has	 had	 a	 profound	 impact	 on	 tourism	 studies	 (see	 also
Hollinshead,	2006).	Notwithstanding	several	important	exceptions,	it	seems	fair	to	say	that	the
taken-for-granted	 ontological	 perspective	 in	much	 of	 tourism	 research’s	 40-year	 history	 has
been	to	work	from	a	correspondence-based	theory	of	truth,	such	that	there	has	been	seen	to	be	a
reality	“out	 there”	 for	 researchers	 to	attempt	 to	capture,	 as	well	 as	a	comfort	 level	with	 the
assumption	that	attempts	to	apprehend	it	are	objectively	verifiable.	Although	there	seems	to	be
a	broad	diversity	of	opinion	on	how	best	to	produce	valid	knowledge	(i.e.,	disagreement	at	the
methodological	level),	 it	has	historically	been	relatively	rare	for	empirical	pieces	in	tourism
studies	 to	 question	 the	 idea	 that—with	 the	 correct	methods	 in	 hand—we	can	get	 the	 correct
answers.	 To	 take	 an	 analogy	 from	 the	 hardhat	 type	 of	 construction	 site,	 there	 has	 been	 a
keenness	to	argue	about	building	methods	but	a	corresponding	evasiveness	on	the	question	of
foundations,	and	therefore	a	lack	of	consideration	for,	what	the	implications	might	be	if	there
turn	out	to	be	no	foundations	at	all.	I	will	call	the	perspective	that	arises	from	this	confluence
of	ideas—a	stance	that	perceives	a	legible	coherence	flowing	between	an	external	reality	and
the	 production	 of	 verifiable	 knowledge	 about	 that	 reality	 courtesy	 of	 simply	 using	 the	 right
tools—epistemic	literalism.
Epistemic	 literalism	 has	 spurred	 strong	 critique	 in	 tourism	 studies	 from	 many	 angles.
Notable	within	 this	 body	 of	 critique	 is	Tribe’s	 (2006)	 piece	 “The	Truth	 about	 Tourism”,	 in
which	he	conceived	the	idea	of	a	knowledge	force-field,	through	which	our	inquires	about	our
tourism	world	are	refracted,	thus	making	it	impossible	to	know	whether	we	have	ever	captured
any	 tourism	world	 that	 might	 exist	 external	 to	 our	 own	 conceptions	 of	 it.	 Conclusions	 like
Tribe’s	implicitly	beg	the	practical	question	of	whether,	if	tourism	reality	can	never	be	directly
apprehended,	 there	 is	 any	 point	 in	 thinking	 about	 it	 objectively	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 In	 other
words,	who	cares	if	there	is	a	reality	out	there,	if	we	can	never	capture	it	literally	anyway?
Pernecky	(2012)	spells	out	this	problem	explicitly,	in	his	discussion	regarding	how	social
constructionism	 has	 tended	 to	 be	 misunderstood	 as	 necessarily	 implying	 adherence	 to	 a
relativist	 ontology—the	 view	 that	 there	 is,	 in	 fact,	 no	 reality	 independent	 of	 mental
conceptualizations	of	it—when	this	characterization	is	actually	more	of	a	stereotype	and	is	not
representative	of	what	most	who	work	under	the	constructionist	banner	genuinely	believe.	He
thus	 makes	 it	 clear	 that	 constructionism,	 for	 many	 of	 its	 adherents,	 is	 not	 an	 ontological
position,	 but	 rather	 an	 epistemological	 one,	 which	 does	 not	 necessarily	 feel	 the	 need	 to
concern	 itself	with	ontological	matters	at	all.	 It	 is	possible,	 scholars	 like	Pernecky	argue,	 to
remain	ontologically	agnostic,	and	to	simply	take	up	the	story	at	the	point	of	the	individual	and
collective	 conceptions	 of	 reality	 people	 hold,	which	 have	 consequences	 for	 themselves	 and
others.
Botterill	 (2014),	 in	 a	 commentary	 responding	 to	 Pernecky,	 invests	 effort	 in	 rebutting
Pernecky’s	claim	that	constructionism	can	be	both	realist	and	relativist	(i.e.,	believing	both	that
phenomena	exist	independently	of	our	knowledge	of	them	and	that	our	knowledge	of	them	can
only	ever	be	relative	to	ourselves	as	knowers);	but	the	piece	ultimately	succeeds	more	in	quite
helpfully	 distinguishing	 constructionism	 from	 Botterill’s	 own	 position	 of	 philosophical
commitment,	critical	realism.	In	another	paper,	Botterill,	together	with	Platenkamp,	explicates
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this	 intriguing	 perspective,	 characterizing	 critical	 realism	 as	 making	 a	 distinction	 between
transitive	 and	 intransitive	 domains	 of	 the	 social	 world,	 with	 the	 former	 consisting	 of	 our
concepts,	 theories,	 and	 understandings	 about	 phenomena,	 and	 the	 latter	 referring	 to	 the
structures	 and	 properties	 of	 phenomena	which	 are	 largely	 enduring	 (but	 not	 immutable)	 and
which	exert	constraints	on	human	agency	(Platenkamp	&	Botterill,	2013).	Critical	realism,	as
he	explains	 in	 the	commentary,	 is	distinguished	by	 its	ontological	commitment	 to	recognizing
these	distinct	domains	(or	“layers”	of	reality)	and	exercising	the	methodological	approach	of
“retroduction,”	wherein	researchers	observe	the	present	state	of	things	and	then	search	for	the
structural-level	features	 that	enable	 that	state	(and	in	some	cases	make	alternative	states	 less
likely,	or	even	near	impossible).	This	process	continues,	in	practical	terms	essentially	without
limit,	as	deeper	enabling	layers	are	uncovered	for	the	conditions	that	rest	atop	them.	Thus,	to
extrapolate	from	Botterill’s	own	example	(Botterill,	2014),	a	person’s	ability	to	fly	across	an
international	border	as	a	tourist	is	contingent	in	part	on	that	person	holding	a	passport;	which
in	turn	is	contingent	on	humanity	embracing	an	organizing	system	of	the	population	into	citizens
of	nation-states;	which	in	turn	is	contingent	on	ideologies	about	inclusivity	and	exclusivity	of
social	contracts;	which	in	 turn	may	be	contingent	on	historical	(and	possibly	contemporary?)
ideologies	about	race,	ethnicity,	and	identity	or	perhaps	on	material	circumstances	of	historical
human	 contact	 patterns	 and	 linguistic	 distributions;	 which	 in	 turn	 may	 be	 influenced	 by
geographical	 conditions;	 and	 so	 forth.	 Botterill	 locates	 the	 power	 of	 critical	 realism	 in	 its
explanatory	 potential,	 arguing	 that	 constructionism	 is	 concerned	 only	 with	 the	 transitive
domain,	 and	 hence	 is	 infinitely	 trapped	 in	 an	 epistemological	 hall	 of	mirrors,	with	 only	 the
“processes	and	protocols	of	the	relevant	social	scientific	discipline	communit[y]”	to	serve	as
arbiters	 of	 validity—though	he	 never	makes	 it	 clear	what	 truth	 standard	 there	 is	 for	 critical
realists	 to	 appeal	 to	 in	 order	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 they	 have	 gotten	 their	 retroductions	 right,
beyond	 those	 same	 “processes	 and	 protocols”	 that	 govern	 constructionist	 (or	 any	 other)
knowledge	production	acts	(Botterill,	2014,	p.	294).
What	appears	to	be	so	valuable	about	critical	realism,	however,	is	the	overt	emphasis	on
consequences	 that	 it	 adds	 to	 the	 realist	 portion	of	 the	 constructionist	 scene	 characterized	by
Pernecky.	Phenomena	(like	passports)	have	the	power	to	produce	effects.	Whether	or	not	we
can	always	properly	apprehend	those	effects,	they	nevertheless	exist.	And	what	we	apprehend
them	to	be—correctly	or	incorrectly—also	produces	effects	of	its	own.	We,	as	knowers	(and
moreover	as	embodied	knowers),	are	bound	within	the	system	of	phenomena	producing	effects
(Gadamer,	 1975).	 This	 is	 very	 much	 akin	 to	 what	 could	 be	 called	 pragmatist	 humanism’s
contingency-based	 ontology	 (discussed	 further	 below),	 as	 well	 as	 its	 claim	 that	 holding	 an
antifoundational	 epistemology	 does	 not	 absolve	 us	 from	 accepting	 that	 our	 actions	 produce
effects.
What	 humanism	 would	 add	 to	 this	 picture,	 however,	 is	 a	 specific	 axiological	 claim:
namely,	that	the	consequential	nature	of	our	existence	and	actions	results	in	moral	obligations.
We	must	 seek	 to	 understand	 the	 effects	 produced	 by	 the	 contingencies	 in	 our	 world,	 in	 the
interest	of	promoting	the	flourishing	and	decreasing	the	suffering	of	humans	and	other	beings.
Furthermore,	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 secure	 truth	 standard	 does	 not	 render	 us	 impotent	 for	 making
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progress,	 as	 measured	 by	 the	 standard	 of	 our	 collective,	 negotiated	 articulations	 of	 what	 a
good	life	would	look	like.	There	is	no	GPS	system	to	definitively	confirm	that	we	are	on	the
right	 path,	 but	 we	 can	 still	 watch	 the	 landmarks	 around	 the	 horizon	 and	 make	 reasonable
judgments	about	whether	we	are	headed	toward	or	away	from	them,	although	this	is	sometimes
more	 straightforward	 than	 others,	 and	 two	 hikers	 traveling	 together	 may	 have	 different
visibilities	or	read	the	same	landscape	in	different	ways.
Belief	in	the	reality	of	cause	and	effect	also	opens	transformative	potential.	If	we	believe
in	consequences	and	hold	hope	that	we	may	sometimes	be	able	to	understand	where	they	came
from,	 then	we	may	sometimes	be	able	 to	change	 them	by	doing	 things	differently.	Sometimes
we	 succeed	 in	 doing	 things	 differently	 by	 engaging	 with	 the	 intransitive	 domain,	 as	 when
Higgins-Desbiolles	 (2012)	 deconstructs	 the	 forces	 of	 global	 capitalism	 that	 produce
mainstream	tourism	services	in	a	particular	form	and	explores	how	things	could	be	different,
through	an	on-the-ground	analysis	of	the	example	of	Argentina’s	Hotel	Bauen,	which	was	taken
over	from	bankruptcy	by	workers	who	revitalized	the	property	and	began	to	run	it	as	a	worker
cooperative.	Through	this	work,	Higgins-Desbiolles	follows	the	call	of	Giroux	(2008,	p.	141)
to	 “make	 visible	 alternative	 models	 of	 radical	 democratic	 relations”	 (cited	 in	 Higgins-
Desbiolles	2012,	p.	625),	thereby	challenging	the	dominant	neoliberal	model,	with	its	effects
that	 tend	 to	 be	 taken	 as	 natural,	 rather	 than	 recognized	 as	 contingencies	 of	 their	 causes.
Similarly,	Munar’s	(2010)	work	on	critical	digital	studies	engages	with	the	intransitive	domain
in	the	context	of	identity,	social	interaction,	and	power,	exploring	how	new	technologies	(such
as	 social	 media)	 are	 impacting	 both	 individual	 and	 social	 life.	 Through	 this	 work,	 Munar
recasts	 contemporary	 communications	 technologies	 and	 travel	 experiences,	 from	 tools	 and
practices	in	the	hands	of	subjects,	to	entities	which	can	each	unleash	productive	powers	latent
in	the	other,	when	the	two	are	joined	together—powers	which	can	ultimately	turn	back	on	the
subject	(Munar,	2013).
Other	times	we	succeed	in	doing	things	differently	by	engaging	with	the	transitive	domain
—by	questioning	our	own	discourses.	While	much	work	in	this	regard	in	tourism	studies	has
been	 deconstructive	 in	 nature,	 there	 are	 also	 examples	 of	 creative	 energy	 manifested	 to
catalyze	new	ways	of	 thinking	and	being.	Grimwood’s	 (2015a)	 soulful	 project	 to	 launch	 the
construction	 of	 a	 “moral	 morphology”	 for	 tourism	 studies,	 through	 his	 work	 in	 Nunavut,
illustrates	 the	 power	 that	 lies	 in	 casting	 our	metaphorical	 redescriptions	 of	 landscapes	 and
human	 engagement	 with	 them	 in	 relational	 ways.	 Through	 a	 mobile	 ethnography,	 traveling
through	 the	 Thelon	 riverscape	 both	with	 indigenous	 inhabitants	 and	with	 groups	 of	 tourists,
Grimwood	 redescribed	 the	 area	 as	 a	 space	 of	 emplacement,	 wayfaring,	 and	 gathering:
relational	and	inclusive	metaphors	that,	“in	their	fluidity,	hybridity	and	indeterminacy	…	refuse
absolute,	 universal	 or	 divisive	 expressions	 of	 value,”	 and	 which	 thus	 help	 us	 to	 transcend
dominant	discourses	of	Arctic	spaces	as	“empty	nature”	to	be	conserved	for	tourist	use,	rather
than	as	spaces	that,	in	actuality,	do	and	should	host	a	multiplicity	of	engagements	and	meanings
(Grimwood,	2015a,	p.	3).	Similarly,	 in	her	contribution	 to	her	new	book	with	colleagues	on
Disruptive	Tourism	and	Its	Untidy	Guests,	Veijola	(2014)	attempts	to	radically	redescribe	the
notion	of	community,	doubting	as	she	does	that	our	traditional	conceptualization	of	this	idea	as
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rooted	in	shared	identity,	place	possession,	and	so	forth	will	continue	to	be	robust	and	relevant
given	 contemporary	mobilities.	 She	 explores	 the	 alternative	 possibility	 of	 community	 as	 an
“embodied	 being-with”	 that	 does	 not	 impose	 on	 either	 hosts	 or	 guests	 in	 a	 way	 that
compromises	plurality,	and	which	gives	rise	to	the	ethical	possibility	of	“mobile	neighboring”
(pp.	71–72,	87).	What	both	Grimwood	and	Veijola	emphasize	 is	 the	need	 to	explore	ethical
ways	of	being	 together	without	being	 the	same,	and	both	powerfully	 illustrate	 the	generative
capabilities	 that	 lie	within	 the	 transitive	domain,	demonstrating	 that	not	only	phenomena,	but
also	 the	 ways	 we	 understand	 those	 phenomena,	 can	 be	 consequential.	 They	 both	 represent
inspiring	 examples	 of	 scholars	 who	 move	 beyond	 the	 task	 of	 deconstruction	 to	 work	 on
actively	building	better	 discursive	 futures—a	move	very	much	 in	harmony	with	Pritchard	 et
al.’s	(2011)	project	of	“hopeful	tourism.”
Work	that	takes	up	the	task	of	creating	better	futures	without	simultaneously	needing	to	seek
solid	truth	foundations	is	very	much	in	line	with	the	spirit	of	humanism,	especially	as	captured
in	Rorty’s	(1989)	work	Contingency,	Irony,	and	Solidarity.	In	this	volume,	Rorty	first	makes	a
case	 for	 antifoundationalism,	 offering	 a	 sweeping	 characterization	 of	 reality	 (including
language,	 the	 self,	 and	 community)	 as	 contingency-based,	 stoking	 his	 argument	 with	 such
diverse	intellectual	nutrients	as	Freudian	psychology	and	the	fiction	of	Proust.	He	then	posits
that	taking	an	ontological	view	of	a	world	characterized	by	contingency	and	always	in	process
constitutes	not	 an	 impediment	 to,	 but	 rather	 the	background	condition	 against	which,	we	can
pursue	our	moral	commitments	(see	also	Veijola,	Germann	Molz,	Pyyhtinen,	Höckert,	&	Grit,
2014,	p.	7).
But	there	is	more	to	humanism	than	epistemological	and	axiological	claims,	of	the	type	so
beautifully	 articulated	 by	 Rorty	 and	 others,	 about	 functioning	 well	 in	 an	 antifoundational
world.	Humanism	is	also	a	popular	movement.	It	is	a	collective	practice	by	people	seeking	a
way	of	being	in	the	world	that	does	not	require	foundations	beyond	their	own	epistemic	power.
The	people	who	gather	in	“ethical	societies”	around	the	globe	to	explore	good	ways	of	acting
toward	their	neighbors	and	their	planet,	and	to	celebrate	life’s	passages	and	share	communally
in	its	 joys	and	sorrows,	are	implicitly	arguing	that	there	can	be	magic	and	mystery—and	life
purpose—without	foundations	like	religion	or	science.	And	contemporary	humanism	is	also	on
some	level	descended	from	Renaissance	humanism,	revisionist	as	it	has	been	and	continues	to
be,	 and	 as	 such	 it	 captures	 some	 of	 the	 optimism	 and	 wonder	 of	 that	 era	 regarding	 human
capacity	for	beautiful	and	virtuous	creative	acts.	Thus,	it	is	a	standpoint	to	speak	from,	but	also
one	to	celebrate,	as	our	window,	which	opens	onto	a	world	rich	for	engagement.
Near	the	end	of	his	life,	Foucault	was	quoted	in	an	interview,	as	he	expressed	his	musings
about	 art,	 saying	 “What	 strikes	me	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 our	 society,	 art	 has	 become	 something
which	is	related	only	to	objects	and	not	to	individuals,	or	to	life.	That	art	is	something	which	is
specialized	or	which	is	done	by	experts	who	are	artists.	But	couldn’t	everyone’s	life	become	a
work	of	art?	Why	should	the	lamp	or	the	house	be	an	art	object,	but	not	our	life?”	(reported	in
Rabinow,	1984).	For	many	of	us	in	tourism	studies	who	hold	antifoundationalist	leanings;	who
think	that	knowledge	production	is	(consequence-laden,	yes)	human	redescription	all	the	way
down,	 flowing,	 as	 Gadamer	 (1975)	 might	 conceptualize	 it,	 from	 the	 back-and-forth	 push
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between	 ourselves	 and	 the	 world;	 and	who	 see	 value	 in	 art	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 enhance	 empathic
capacity	and	moral	 imagination,	 to	cope	with	complexity,	and	 to	promote	 liberatory	 thinking
(Caton,	2015a,	2015b),	it	seems	increasingly	difficult	to	resist	Foucault’s	invitation.
So	are	you	one	who	suspects	that	 the	world	is	not	merely	a	figment	of	your	imagination?
Do	 you	 lean	 toward	 antifoundationalism,	 finding	 yourself	 unconvinced	 that	 there	 is	 any
definitive	truth	standard	against	which	we	can	securely	measure	our	understandings	of	this	not-
solely-in-our-mind	 world?	 Does	 metaphorical	 redescription	 sound	 good	 to	 you,	 as	 a
characterization	back	to	yourself	of	what	you	are	doing,	as	you	are	creating	and	conveying	your
own	understandings	of	that	not-solely-in-your-mind	world,	using	whichever	methods	you	feel
allow	you	to	process	it	in	a	compelling	and	productive	way?	Do	you	believe	that	the	features
of	our	world	and	our	attempts	to	make	sense	of	them	produce	consequences?	Do	you	come	in
hope,	bearing	a	transformative	ontology,	accepting	reality	as	in	the	making,	and	to	some	degree
ours	 for	 the	 changing?	Do	you	 sense	 a	moral	 obligation	 (possibly	one	you	 cannot	 rationally
explain)	for	yourself	and	others	to	do	our	best	to	untangle	the	world’s	features,	happenings,	and
consequences	in	a	quest	to	promote	flourishing	and	decrease	suffering?	And	do	you	harbor	a
sense	 of	 awe	 and	 wonder	 about	 the	 world?	 Do	 you	 experience	 the	 world	 in	 a	 way	 that
transcends	and	defies	complete	sense-making	and	articulation—and	feel	grateful	for	the	grace
of	being,	 in	a	realm	where	comprehensibility	shades	 into	mystery?	And	do	you	find	yourself
craving	art	in	your	lived	experience,	as	a	strategy	to	evade	closure	and	the	tyranny	of	certainty?
If	so,	then,	in	addition	to	whatever	else	you	may	call	yourself,	you	might	also	be	a	humanist.
CONCLUSION
So	what	is	the	cash	value	of	imagining	a	humanist	paradigm	for	tourism	studies?	While	I	would
be	the	last	to	argue	that	philosophical	explorations	always	need	to	pay	for	their	ticket	through
the	practical	outcomes	they	produce,	 there	nevertheless	 is	value	in	considering	this	question.
From	where	I	sit,	I	can	see	two	key	interventions	that	become	possible	by	conceptualizing	the
diverse	 work	 discussed	 above	 (along	 with	 many	 other	 cognate	 projects!)	 under	 a	 larger
philosophical	umbrella.
First,	 and	 unsurprisingly	 given	 the	 gendered	 history	 of	 academia,	 it	 is	 the	 tendency	 of
scholarly	 discourse	 to	 proceed	 in	 a	masculinist	 style,	 where	 the	mode	 of	 engagement	 is	 to
deconstruct	 others’	 arguments,	 searching	 for	 holes	 in	 one’s	 interlocutor’s	 work	 that	 open	 a
space	for	oneself	to	say	something	important.	Although	the	new	argument	offered	indeed	often
has	much	value,	its	positioning	as	oppositional	to	what	has	come	before	is	frequently	nothing
more	 than	an	unnecessary	distraction,	drawing	both	 the	writer	and	 the	 reader’s	energy	away
from	what	is	actually	at	stake	in	the	discussion.	It	is	as	though	knowledge	production	were	a
sport,	with	rules,	referees,	winners,	and	losers,	rather	than	a	serious	undertaking,	rooted	in	the
purpose	 of	making	 the	world	 a	 bit	 better	 off,	 and	 one	 practiced	with	 respect,	 care,	 and	 an
orientation	of	helpfulness	toward	one’s	fellow	travelers	engaged	in	the	same	journey.
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This	means	when	pockets	of	resistance	begin	to	arise	to	the	perspective	currently	carrying
the	 day—in	 our	 case,	 epistemic	 literalism—that	 scholars	 championing	 alternatives	 tend	 to
position	their	work	not	only	in	opposition	to	that	dominant	perspective	but	also	in	opposition
to	the	alternatives	others	are	offering,	in	order	to	carve	discursive	space	for	themselves	at	the
field	day.	While	I	am	in	no	way	an	advocate	of	polishing	out	the	beautiful	pluralism	that	exists
across	the	tourism	academy	(and	with	particular	pertinence	to	this	context,	the	pluralism	among
those	of	us	who	 reject	 epistemic	 literalism),	 I	do	believe	 that	 (with	 rare	exceptions	 like	 the
towering	 oeuvre	 of	Hollinshead)	 our	 intellectual	 energy	 spent	 searching	 for	 distinctions	 has
vastly	outstripped	that	which	we	have	expended	on	syncretic	efforts	that	could	illuminate	not
just	our	differences,	but	our	relations	to	each	other.	Thus,	any	move	in	the	opposite	direction—
any	 effort	 to	 articulate	 relationality—intrinsically	 stands	 as	 an	 intervention	 to	 masculinist
academic	discourse	in	tourism	studies.
At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 a	 mode	 of	 engagement	 that	 focuses	 almost	 exclusively	 on
delineating	 distinctions	 also	 eventually	 bears	 consequences	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 epistemological
politics.	Just	as	a	disorganized	and	fractionated	left	has	frequently	led	to	the	election	of	right-
wing	governments	in	the	North	American	context	from	which	I	write,	so	too	does	a	fractionated
(and	at	its	worst,	cantankerous)	alternative	tourism	academy	create	an	even	greater	struggle	for
itself	in	challenging	the	received	view	of	knowledge	production	in	our	field.	This	is	important
because,	 in	 the	age	of	 the	neoliberal	university	 (Caton,	2014b;	Dredge	et	al.,	2012b;	Munar,
2007),	 our	 ability	 to	 successfully	 challenge	 epistemic	 literalism	 as	 the	 only	 game	going	 has
consequences	for	the	ways	we	can	do	scholarship,	the	kinds	of	knowledge	we	can	create,	and
ultimately—if	 we	 buy	 our	 own	 arguments—the	 kinds	 of	 interventions	 we	 can	 make	 in	 our
world.	 We	 need	 not	 be	 the	 same	 as	 one	 another,	 nor	 hide	 from	 discussions	 about	 our
differences.	But	we	do	need	to	expend	more	creative	energy	in	thinking	about	our	connections.
Paradoxically,	exercising	our	syncretic	imagination	may	be	one	of	the	most	powerful	tools	in
our	arsenal	for	succeeding	in	carving	out	more	space	to	be	ourselves.
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